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A LOGICAL EXTENSION:
THE SUPREME COURT EXTENDS RIGHTS OF




Almost thirty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized the right of
government employees to be protected from discharge in retaliation
for expression of their political views.' Twenty years ago, the Court
further expanded this protection so that most government employees
would not fear discharge in retaliation for their political associations. 2
Six years ago, the Court strengthened these protections by barring
government employers from taking retaliatory actions short of dis-
charge as a result of their employees' protected acts of speech or asso-
ciation.3 Last summer, the Court recognized that the relationship
between government contractors and the government they serve is
very much like the relationship between government employees and
their government employers.4 As a result, fundamental constitutional
rights of political speech and association heretofore denied to citizens
simply because they earn a living by serving the government are now
provided to individuals who work for the government as independent
contractors.5
This Note first traces the history of the two lines of cases that have
protected government employees' rights of political speech and asso-
ciation.6 It then provides the factual and procedural history of the two
cases in which the Court extended these rights of political speech,
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,7 and political association,
1. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
2. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
3. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
4. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996) [hereinafter O'Hare
I/]; Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
5. See supra note 4.
6. See infra Section I.
7. 116 S. Ct. 2342.
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O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,8 to independent con-
tractors who do business with the government.9 This Note demon-
strates that these decisions sit squarely with the plain meaning of the
First Amendment and with almost fifty years of the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. This Article then focuses on the analyti-
cal and factual flaws in Justice Scalia's caustic joint dissent to the
Court's decision in these two cases. Finally, this Note concludes that it
is the people who will benefit from government/contractor relation-
ships which are focused on business, not politics.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment Rights of Speech and Association
The First Amendment demands that: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech.., or the right of people peacea-
bly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."'1 Justice Hugo Black viewed these words as absolute in their
command:
[Of] course the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for
[free speech] involves a balancing of conflicting interests. [But] the
Framers themselves did this balancing when they wrote the [Consti-
tution]. Courts have neither the right nor the power [to] make a
different [evaluation]."
Justice Black's words have never been accepted by the Court and
there has always been tension between the seemingly clear command
of the First Amendment's words and the interests of governments
large and small to curtail this broad right. 12 Nonetheless, the Supreme
8. 116 S. Ct. 2353.
9. See infra Section II. The analytical focus of this Note is generally restricted to the Court's
decision to extend such rights to independent contractors who serve the government. For an
excellent discussion of the internal tension between the Court's dual approach to the issues of
free speech and association rights in government employment cases, see Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Comment, Patronage and the First Amendment: A Structural Approach, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369,
1380-81 (1989) (proposing a structural test focusing on protecting the democratic process rather
than "vague and ambigous rules governing patronage practices" which developed through the
application of freedom of speech doctrine to a freedom of association case); Craig D. Singer,
Comment, Conduct and Belief- Public Employee's First Amendment Rights to Free Expression
and Political Affiliation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 897 (1992) (rejecting a unified approach in favor of
strengthening the distinction between the balancing test used in government employee speech
cases from freedom and association applied in patronage cases).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879 (1960).
12. Justice Black's views are illustrative: "Some people regard the prohibitions of the Consti-
tution, even its most unequivocal commands, as mere admonitions which Congress need not
always observe." Id. at 866. Justice Black recited, in support of his observation, the use of
balancing tests such as "the clear and present danger test." Id. Black contrasted such views (and
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Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has generally moved in the
direction of increased rights of expression and association.13
Although a broad analysis of the Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence is beyond the scope of this Note, a few words are in order
before progressing to the Court's specific application of such rights in
the context of government employment.
1. First Amendment Freedom of Speech
Many justifications have been advanced in support of First Amend-
ment freedom of speech. They include the creation of an open mar-
ketplace of ideas, promoting self-development and enabling self-
governance through political expression. 14 Although there has been
much research and writing on the subject, the available information is
ambiguous enough such that "attempts to develop a First Amendment
jurisprudence based on historical evidence regarding the intent of the
framers have proven quite manipulable.' 5
Despite disagreement as to original intent, the Court has consist-
ently approached any content-based abridgment of expression as
"presumptively at odds with the First Amendment.' 6 Deference has
been granted by the Court to virtually all speech acts except in narrow
circumstances where such "utterances are no essential part of any ex-
position of ideas.' 7 Recent examples of the Court's respect for free-
such balancing tests) with his own view, that where the Constitution provides explicit language
regarding fundamental rights, any inquiry which purports to balance government interests
against the Constitutional command, is barred by the fact that the framers have already per-
formed such a balancing test prior to drafting the words of the Constitution. Id. at 874-75.
13. For instance, First Amendment limitations did not apply to state governments until 1925.
Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1137, 1138 (1983) (referencing the Court's decision in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925)); see also ARCHIBALD Cox, The Role of The Supreme Court in American Society, in 1
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPREATIONS 198-99
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (noting that, as late as 1922, the Supreme Court had explicitly held
there was no constitutional restriction on the ability of a state government to limit the free
speech rights of its citizens).
14. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-1, at 785-88 (2d ed. 1988).
15. Id. § 12-1, at 785 n.3.
16. Id. § 12-2, at 790. Such an approach flows not only from an interpretation of the First
Amendment in isolation, but also from the Constitution as a whole, which exists as "a bulwark
against tyranny, a force for tempering the shortsightedness and unruliness of electoral politics...
[and] a check against majority oppression of minorities." Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Per-
spective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 453 (1985).
17. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that "fighting words"
are not entitled to First Amendment protection). Fighting words are but one of several excep-
tions carved out by the Court for which First Amendment protections are either limited or alto-
gether unavailable. The various exceptions to free speech protection are not further discussed
here because they are not relevant to the issues raised by the subject cases. See also GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITuTION: A COMMENTARY 53 (1995) (distin-
1997]
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dom of speech include a case in which a war protester was permitted
to wear a jacket in a courtroom despite the fact that it was embla-
zoned with the words "Fuck the Draft"'8 and another in which the
Court invalidated government restrictions on pharmacy advertising
despite the existence of valid regulatory interests. 19
2. First Amendment Freedom of Association
Although freedom of speech is explicit in the language of the First
Amendment, freedom of association was not expressly recognized by
the Supreme Court until 1958. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son,20 Justice Harlan formally articulated a First Amendment right to
freedom of association and elevated its status as a separate constitu-
tional right emanating from the First Amendment.21 Professor
Thomas Emerson commented at the time that Justice Harlan first cre-
ated a right of association that was linked to freedom of speech, and
then raised it to the status of an independent right.2 2 Twenty-five
years later, however, the Court emphasized that the freedom to asso-
ciate is important only inasmuch as it protects individuals who are as-
sociating "for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion. '2 3 In Roberts v. United States
guishing "freedom of expression" from the narrower "freedom of speech," the latter of which is
directly linked to the right of self-governance).
18. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971).
19. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770-73 (1976). The Court noted that the choice "between the dangers of suppressing informa-
tion and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, [is, ultimately, a choice] that the First
Amendment makes for us." Id. at 770.
20. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
21. Id. at 466. For commentary in the wake of NAACP, see William 0. Douglas, The Right of
Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1963); Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Morgan W. Solter, Editorial Note, Freedom of
Association-A New and Fundamental Civil Right, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653 (1959).
22. Emerson, supra note 21, at 2. Professor Emerson further argued that association rights
are individual rights not derived solely from the First Amendment, but are implied from the
entire constitutional framework. Id. at 5. This analysis reflects the Court's perspective in
NAACP that certain associational freedoms derive from the First Amendment while others de-
rive from notions of substantive due process. Id. This approach is much like Justice Douglas'
description of the right of privacy as a right emanating from the First Amendment's penumbra,
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965). Professor Emerson's view that the
Court in NAACP created an independent right of association has not been universally accepted.
See Reena Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1 (1977) (proposing that the Court has never explicitly stated that the right to association is
independent from the First Amendment; instead, the Court linked the right of association to
freedom of speech, or only hinted at broader possibilities).
23. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). For a discussion of the Court's
approach to freedom of association in the context of political patronage, see Blanche Duett,
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Jaycees,24 the Court also stated that infringements on freedom of asso-
ciation may be justified where there is a compelling state interest, un-
related to expression, that cannot be achieved through means
"significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."2' Impor-
tantly, freedom of association grants individuals the right to do in con-
cert what they have a right to do if acting as individuals.26
B. Political Speech by Government Employees: The Pickering
Balancing Test
The foregoing discussion relates to citizens generally, but the
Supreme Court had historically excluded government employees from
certain First Amendment protections.27 The Court first offered gener-
alized free speech protection in the context of government employ-
ment to an Illinois school teacher who was dismissed by a public
school board after the teacher sent a letter to a local newspaper criti-
cizing the board over the manner in which it allocated school funds.28
In response to this letter, the school board dismissed the teacher be-
cause it determined that publication of the letter was "detrimental to
the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the dis-
trict."'29 The Illinois courts affirmed the dismissal, holding that the
school board's interests outweighed the teacher's First Amendment
rights.30 The Supreme Court reversed in Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion31 and imposed upon the government employer a balancing test
which measured the employee's right of free speech as a citizen
against the government's right as an employer to manage its delivery
of services to the public.32
Comment, First Amendment Freedom of Association: Destruction by the Supreme Court's New
Stare Decisis Doctrine?, 33 S. TEx. L. REV. 617, 618 (1992) (predicting weakened protection of
associational freedoms as a result of the Court's change in composition as well as the Court's
shifting stare decisis doctrine).
24. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
25. Id. at 623. For arguments that the right to freedom of association should be broader than
as articulated by the Court, see Raggi, supra note 22 at 15-18; Aviam Soifer, "Toward a Genera-
lized Notion of the Right to Form or Join an Association ": An Essay for Tom Emerson, 38 CASE
W. RES. L .REV. 641 (1987-88).
26. TRmE, supra note 14 § 12-26, at 1011-12 (citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290 (1981)).
27. See infra note 41.
28. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 565. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Will
County. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Il. 1967).
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565, 568-73.
19971
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected the contention that
citizens abandon their First Amendment rights to political expression
when they accept employment with a government agency. 33 He did
recognize, however, that the government, in its role as an employer,
has a right to regulate employee conduct that impairs the efficiency of
government services. 34 The problem, said Justice Marshall, was to
balance these potentially competing interests.35
To achieve this balance, the Court evaluated several factors: 1)
whether the employee's statements negatively impacted workplace
harmony or the board's ability to maintain workplace discipline; 2)
whether the teacher's relationship with his superiors was a close one
requiring personal loyalty and confidence; 3) whether the statements
impacted or reflected an inability of the teacher to perform his job
duties; and 4) whether the statements impacted the regular operation
of the schools generally. 36 In applying the test to the facts at hand, the
Court rejected the board's arguments because: 1) the teacher's state-
ments were not directed at fellow employees and did not otherwise
interfere with the board's ability to maintain workplace discipline; 2)
the teacher's job responsibilities were not such that they required per-
sonal loyalty to the board;37 3) the teacher's statements did not reflect
on his ability to satisfactorily perform his job duties; and 4) the state-
ments did not otherwise impact the general operation of the schools. 38
Justice Marshall commented that the teacher's speech pertained to
matters of public interest, and observed that "[t]eachers are, as a class,
the members of a community most likely to have informed and defi-
nite opinions as to how [school] funds ... should be spent. Accord-
ingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal. ' 39
Importantly, Justice Marshall distinguished between the teacher's
role as an employee and his role as a member of the general public
and held that his First Amendment right to debate about public issues
as an informed member of the general public outweighed the fact of
33. Id. at 568. Justice Marshall relied in part on Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589(1967), in which the Court stated, "[t]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uni-
formly rejected." Id. at 605-606.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 569-73.
37. Id. Because some of the teacher's statements were factually incorrect, the board had ar-
gued that those statements reflected on the teacher's ability to teach. Id. at 568-69.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 572.
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his status as an employee of the government.40 As a result, "absent
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a
teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment."'41
Fifteen years later, the Court sharpened the distinction between the
constitutional protection afforded to government employees' exercise
of political speech and the government's right as an employer to regu-
late expressive acts in the workplace.42 In Connick v. Myers,43 the
Court upheld a district attorney's right to discharge an employee who
had circulated a survey to fellow employees in order to gain support
for her interest in changing the way that employees were assigned to
different job assignments." The district attorney dismissed the em-
ployee, claiming her actions incited a workplace rebellion and consti-
tuted insubordination. 45 Justice White reminded the lower courts, in
Connick, to focus on the distinction between the government's role as
a government and its role as an employer; and similarly, to distinguish
between government employees' acts as employees and their acts as
private citizens on matters of public importance. 46
Justice White characterized the Court's interest in protecting gov-
ernment employee free speech rights as a response to loyalty oaths
and other McCarthy-era constraints on association and speech of ex-
isting and prospective government employees.47 Justice White saw
40. Id. at 574.
41. Id. Justice Marshall's support for this statement came from New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Sullivan, relied on
the following words from Justice Brandeis: "Those who won our independence believed ... that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the Amer-
ican government." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan continued in Sullivan to emphasize the government's need to tolerate "caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 270.
42. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 1381 (1983).
43. Id. For criticism of the Court's decision in Connick, see Paul Cerkvenik, Note, Who Your
Friends are Could get you Firedi The Connick 'Public Concern' Test Unjustifiably Restricts Pub-
lic Employees' Associational Rights, 79 MNb,. L. REv. 425 (1994); Mark Strauss, Note, Public
Employees' Freedom of Association: Should Connick v. Myers' Speech-Based Public Concern
Rule Apply?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 473 (1992).
44. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41. The employee, an assistant district attorney, circulated the
petition in response to a notice that she was being transferred to prosecute cases in a different
section of the criminal court. Id.
45. Id. at 141. The insubordinate act was an item on the questionnaire asking fellow employ-
ees if they "had confidence in and would rely on the word" of certain superiors in the district
attorney's office. Id.
46. Id. at 142-43. Justice White was absolutely clear on this point: "The repeated emphasis in
Pickering on the right of a public employee 'as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern,' was not accidental." Id. at 143.
47. Id. at 142-43. Justice White observed:
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Pickering and its progeny as a logical extension of the Court's concern
in these earlier cases because "[s]peech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. '48 But
speech regarding workplace matters is distinguishable from speech
concerning the general public interest.49 Where an employee is speak-
ing not as a member of the general public, but rather is speaking in
her role as an employee, about matters which are peculiar to the em-
ployee's workplace, a government employer may properly act to
"promot[e] efficiency ... and [to] maintain proper discipline in the
public service." 50 As a result, the Court upheld the discharge of the
errant employee.51
These free speech protections are not only restricted to those cases
in which employees have a contractual right to their government job.
The Court made this clear in Perry v. Sinderman52 in which Justice
Stewart said that free speech rights are not contingent upon contrac-
tual rights.53
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the govern-
ment cannot rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech
For most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee hid no
right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including those
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights. The classic formulation of this
position was that of Justice Holmes, who, when sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, observed: "A policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
Id. (citing McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892)). Justice White went
on to cite a series of McCarthy-era cases in which the Court rejected this doctrine, including:
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub. Works, 341
U.S. 716 (1951), Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
48. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
49. Id.; see also Justice White's footnote 8, in which he states that the forum of employee
communication is less important than the content of the expression. Id. at 148 n.8. Thus, that the
expression occurred in the workplace rather than in a public forum is of little consequence.
Rather, the issue is whether the speech pertained to public or private matters. The latter is of far
less constitutional significance than the former. Id. at 148. Similarly, the manner of expression is
relatively unimportant, and the fact that the assistant district attorney utilized a workplace sur-
vey to gather information rather than making explicit comments about her supervisors is of no
constitutional significance. The bottom line is that her speech was related to a private matter,
and thus not within the protections envisioned by Pickering. Id. at 152-53.
50. Id. at 150-51 (citing Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
51. Id. at 154.
52. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
53. Id. at 596.
1997] RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 163
or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to "pro-
duce a result which [it] could not command directly. '54
As a result, even an employee whose only complaint is that his or her
government employment contract has not been renewed is impermis-
sibly harmed if the failure to renew that contract is in retaliation for
that employee's protected public speech.55
C. Political Association by Government Employees: The
Patronage Cases
As noted earlier, the First Amendment right to freedom of expres-
sion is explicit in the language of the amendment.5 6 Freedom of asso-
ciation, however, has been construed by the Court in the absence of
such concrete language.5 7 The Court first recognized such rights in
the context of government employment in Elrod v. Burns.58 The
Court determined that discharge or threat of discharge of government
employees because of their political party affiliation or non-affiliation
violated this right of belief and association.5 9 The employees in that
case, sheriff's deputies in Cook County, Illinois, were summarily dis-
missed by the new Democratic Sheriff soon after he succeeded the
previous incumbent, a Republican.60
54. Id. at 597 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
55. Id. at 596-97. The circumstances in Perry involved a college professor whose employment
contract had expired. Id. at 595. The college board of regents failed to renew the professor's
contract, apparently as a result of his public disagreements with the board in his capacity as a
representative of the teachers' union. Id. at 594-95. Justice Stewart concluded that the profes-
sor's lack of a contract or of tenure was "immaterial" to his free speech claim. Id. at 596-97.
This does not, however, mean that government employees are a special class of individuals with
greater protections than the citizenry at large. That was illustrated in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), in which the Court, entertaining the grievance of yet
another dismissed teacher, remanded for a closer look by the lower court even though the
teacher had satisfied his burden to prove that his protected speech was a substantial factor in the
board's decision not to renew his contract. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the inquiry was not complete until the board was
given an opportunity to prove it would have discharged the employee even in the absence of the
protected conduct, thus reinforcing the government's right to exercise proper discretion in its
role as an employer. Id. The teacher in that case had exceeded his authority in at least one
circumstance that caused him to openly apologize to the board for his transgressions. Id. at 282.
In the face of such conduct, it was reasonable on these limited facts to conclude the board may
have had legitimate reasons to let the contract expire even in the absence of his protected (albeit
distasteful to the board) speech. Id. at 287.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
58. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
59. Id. at 349-50.
60. Id. at 350. One of the four respondents had not been dismissed but was in fear of immi-
nent dismissal at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at 351.
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In Elrod, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion6' first noted that a va-
riety of patronage practices have a long history in the United States. 62
He emphasized at the outset that this opinion related only to a single
practice: the dismissal of government employees solely for their party
affiliation.63
Justice Brennan viewed patronage dismissals as a clear abridgment
of the right of political belief and association. 64 He did not, however,
believe that such dismissals were never justifiable.65 Instead, the plu-
rality held that such abridgments are subject to strict scrutiny.66 Spe-
cifically, Brennan stated:
61. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justice White and Justice Marshall. Id. at 349.
Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 374
(Stewart, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 353-54. Justice Brennan ultimatley had no choice but to acknowledge this troubling
factor for the Court. Justice Powell's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, focused almost exclusively on the historical pedigree for patronage practices and urged
that this pedigree made it improper for the Court to suddenly declare such practices unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 376-89 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell commented that patronage practices
extend back to the presidential administrations of George Washington, John Adams, and
Thomas Jefferson, and that they were substantially strengthened in the practices of President
Jackson. Id. at 378. Powell also asserted that patronage is a healthy practice that "played a
significant role in democratizing American politics." Id. at 379. These arguments are later
echoed in Justice Scalia's dissent to the subject opinions. O'Hare 11, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2369 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text; infra note 168; see C. FISH, THE CIVIL
SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 156-57 (1905); R. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVCE AND THE
CONsTrrunON (1971), Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Law of Patronage at a Crossroads, 12 J.L. &
POL. 341 (1996), Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SCL 115-16 (1959).
63. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 349.
64. Id. at 355-57. Justice Brennan's depth of feeling on the matter was abundant:
An individual who is a member of the out-party maintains affiliation with his own party
at the risk of losing his job .... Political belief and association constitute the core of
those activities protected by the First Amendment .... "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein".... 'There can no longer be any
doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political
beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First
Amendment."
Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 430 (1963)). Justice Brennan analogized to a number of other cases in which the Court had
concluded that affiliations of various kinds were impermissible bases to deny or terminate gov-
ernment employment or to terminate other government benefits. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357-65 (cit-
ing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (rejecting denial of unemployment benefits on the
basis of religious beliefs)); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (rejecting prohibitions on tax
exemptions for failure to declare loyalty to the state); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
(rejecting requirements of loyalty oaths and denials of past Communist party affiliation).
65. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360.
66. Id. at 362-63. "[I]t is not enough that the means chosen in furtherance of the interest be
rationally related to that end." Id. at 362. Strict scrutiny requires that governmental actions "be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that [a] personal right... has not been infringed."
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). More specifically, actions subject to
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[I]f conditioning the retention of public employment on the em-
ployee's support of the in-party is to survive constitutional chal-
lenge, it must further some vital government end by a means that is
least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving
that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitu-
tionally protected rights.67
In evaluating the facts in Elrod, the plurality was not persuaded by
the Sheriff's arguments that "employees of political persuasions not
the same as that of the party in control of public office will not have
the incentive to work effectively and may even be motivated to sub-
vert the incumbent administration's efforts to govern effectively. '68
Instead, the plurality focused on the government's ability, in its role as
an employer, to manage the performance of its employees by the least
intrusive means possible so as to avoid abridging protected rights of
political belief and association. 69 In making this evaluation, Justice
Brennan held that strict scrutiny would be satisfied only if patronage
dismissals are restricted to those employees who hold policymaking
positions.70
Thus, in contrast to the Pickering balancing test invoked in govern-
ment employee free speech cases, the Elrod plurality required strict
scrutiny in free association cases, and then created the policymaker
label in an attempt both to define the strict scrutiny examination and
to create a bright-line measure by which government employers could
determine which employees are protected from patronage dismissals.
Of course, saying that patronage is restricted to policymaker positions
begs the question: Who is a policymaker? Unfortunately, as the plu-
rality recognized, the term is not easy to define.71 Justice Brennan
strict scrutiny are valid only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling government in-
terests. Id.; cf STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1993) (ar-
guing that the term "compelling government interests" is a misnomer because, as opposed to
valid public interests, "government interests" suggest graft, corruption, and other illegitimate
interests that infringe upon citizens' constitutional rights).
67. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363.
68. Id. at 364. Justice Brennan did not think the argument was credible, nor did he think that,
even assuming its validity, political association alone is an adequate basis for imputing ill-will in
most government employment situations. Id. at 364-65 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 606-08 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); Wiemand v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952)).
69. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 366. The Court's focus on the government's role as an employer is
consistent with the approach taken by the Court in Pickering and in Connick. See supra notes
28-46 and accompanying text.
70. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367. The three-judge plurality was joined by Justices Stewart and
Blackmun in the conclusion that non-policymaking, non-confidential government employees
cannot be dismissed solely on the basis of their political beliefs. Id. at 374-75. Justice Stevens




suggested that the term applies to employees with broad responsibili-
ties that are not well-defined and those who function as advisors or
planners in the development of government plans, policies, or goals.72
Then, to complete the strict scrutiny examination, the Court placed
the burden of proof on the government employer to demonstrate that
the patronage dismissal involved a policymaking position. 73
The Court had an opportunity to clarify this policymaker designa-
tion in Branti v. Finkel,74 a case in which two assistant public defend-
ers convinced a district court to enjoin their imminent dismissals on
the basis that the dismissals were purely because of their non-affilia-
tion with the party of the newly elected Public Defender.75 The Public
Defender had argued that the broad responsibilities and confidential
nature of the assistant public defender positions qualified them, under
the Elrod standard, as policymaking employees for which patronage
dismissals are permitted. 76
In rejecting the Public Defender's argument, Justice Stevens stated
that the test is "not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential'
fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring au-
thority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate re-
quirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved. '77 In applying this test, Justice Stevens concluded that the
primary, perhaps the sole, responsibility of an assistant public de-
fender is to the client, not to the state, and such a role, therefore, does
not require a particular party affiliation in order to be performed
effectively.78
The most recent development in the government employee context
occurred in Rutan v. Republican Party.79 In Rutan, a new Republican
governor imposed a hiring freeze for virtually all government posi-
tions and allegedly used the freeze to hire, promote, transfer and re-
72. Id. at 368.
73. Id.
74. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
75. Id. at 508. The district court "permanently enjoined the public defender from terminant-
ing the [assistants] upon the sole grounds of their political belief." Id.
76. Id. at 512.
77. Id. at 518. This virtual re-write of the Elrod criteria illustrates just how difficult it is to
carve out a definition of which government employees are entitled to protection from patronage
practices.
78. Id. at 519. Justice Stewart, who narrowly concurred in Elrod on the basis that non-poli-
cymaking, non-confidential employees are properly immunized from patronage dismissals, vigor-
ously dissented to the Court's conclusion here that lawyer positions requiring the utmost in
confidentiality and substantial professional trust by his or her superiors be provided similar pro-
tection under the Court's new standard. Id. at 520-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
dissented for the same reasons articulated in Elrod. Id. at 521-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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call laid-off employees on the basis of their political affiliations; in
other words, to make patronage placements involving low-level gov-
ernment employees.8 0 Justice Brennan stated that patronage hirings,
transfers, promotions and the like are no more permissible simply be-
cause they involve "deprivations less harsh than dismissal." 8' The
Court held that government employees are protected not only from
patronage firings, but from these other actions as well.82
D. Employee Speech and Association Rights: Summary
In June, 1996, the Supreme Court recognized a number of rights of
government employees under the First Amendment. Citizens do not,
as a consequence of government employment, forfeit their right to
freedom of expression on matters of public concern. Any abridgment
of this right by a government employer must be subjected to a balanc-
ing test that requires the government to demonstrate that such abridg-
ment of its employees' rights as citizens is necessary to the
government's role as an employer in controlling its work place. Citi-
zens do not, as a consequence of government employment, forfeit
their right to affiliate with the political party of their choice. Any con-
straint on this right is subject to strict scrutiny and specifically requires
the government to prove that party affiliation is a necessary require-
ment to the performance of the government position.
While most government employees do not lose any rights of speech
or association, their government employment status grants them no
additional rights as compared with the citizenry at large. As of June
27, 1996, no similar rights had been recognized by the Supreme Court
for persons who served the government as independent contractors
rather than as employees and the circuit courts were in conflict as to
whether such rights should properly be recognized.8 3
80. Id. at 65-66.
81. Id. at 75. Justice Brennan added, "[t]he First Amendment prevents the government, ex-
cept in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interefere with its employ-
ees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate." Id. at 76; see also,
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (barring not only heavy-handed frontal
attacks on the right of association, but also more subtle governmental interference).
82. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ken-
nedy, and joined in part by Justice O'Connor, vigorously attacked Justice Brennan's opinion.
See id. at 92-115 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia's protest echoed Justice Powell's earlier
dissent in Elrod, and asserted that political patronage is endorsed by long tradition and is sup-
ported by its substantial social utility. Id. This dissent presages Justice Scalia's joint dissent to
the subject opinions. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text; infra note 164.
83. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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II. SUBJECt OPINIONS
A. Free Speech: Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr84
Keen Umbehr, owner of a trash hauling business, contracted with
Waubansee County, Kansas and with individual municipalities within
the county to haul trash for a specified rate.85 The contract dictated
automatic annual renewal unless either party gave timely notice that
the contract was to be terminated or renegotiated.8 6 Pursuant to this
agreement, Umbehr hauled trash for six municipalities within the
county for six consecutive years.87
Throughout the term of his contract, Umbehr vigorously criticized
the Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee County
("Board"). 88 His criticism was in the form of letters to the local news-
paper and in vocal participation at the Board meetings.8 9 The subjects
of Umbehr's criticism included the county's landfill user rates, the cost
of obtaining official documents from the county, alleged Board viola-
tions of the Kansas Open Meetings Act, the county's alleged misman-
agement of taxpayers' money and other topics.90 Umbehr's
allegations regarding the Board's violations of the Kansas Open Meet-
ings Act "were vindicated in a consent decree signed by the Board's
members." 91 Shortly thereafter, the Board attempted to terminate
Umbehr's trash hauling contract, but the action was not timely under
the contract.92 Umbehr's contract with the county thus continued for
84. 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
85. Id. at 2345.
86. Id. Each party could terminate the contract by giving 60 days notice, or could institute
renegotiation on 90 days notice. Id. The contract did not specifically provide for collection of
refuse in the county. Instead, the contract gave Umbehr the right to dispose of the waste col-
lected from each of the six towns within the county in the county's landfill, in exchange for
payment of landfill charges at a schedule fixed by the county. Petitioner's Brief to the Supreme
Court at 3, Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996) (No. 94-1654) (1995
WL 477704).
87. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Umbehr (No. 94-1654).
88. Id. at 3-4.
89. Id. Responent's Brief spells out in colorful detail the many speech activities in which
Umbehr engaged. Respondent's Brief, Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342
(1996) (No. 94-1654) (1995 WL 595604). More than merely writing letters to the editor, Umbehr
in 1989 started a weekly editorial column in the local paper in which he criticized many local
government actions, including those by the Board. Respondent's Brief at 3, Umbehr (No. 94-
1654). Umbehr also was quite vocal at Board meetings, often speaking over the Board's at-
tempts to quiet him. Id. at 10-11. The brief leaves little doubt that the Board considered
Umbehr to be a substantial annoyance, and perhaps, a threat to the way in which it conducted its
business. Id. at 4-6.
90. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345.
91. Id. Again, the details in Respondent's Brief more fully suggest the degree of rancor be-
tween the parties. Respondent's Brief at 5-6, Umbehr (No. 94-1654).
92. Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, Umbehr (No. 94-1654).
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an additional year before it was successfully terminated by the
Board.93
Upon termination of his contract, Umbehr filed suit against the
Board, alleging it had terminated his contract in retaliation for his crit-
icism. 94 In making its decision, the lower court assumed the contract
was terminated in retaliation for Umbehr's critical speech, but held
that, as an independent contractor, his conduct was not subject to First
Amendment protections provided to government employees and, ac-
cordingly, granted the Board's summary judgment motion to dismiss
the case.95 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that Umbehr's speech
was protected by the First Amendment in the same fashion as a gov-
ernment employee's speech is protected. 96 Because there was conflict
among the circuits on this question, the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to resolve it.97
The Board argued that independent contractors should be distin-
guished from individuals with status as government employees and
that free speech protections enjoyed by government employees should
not be extended to those who serve the government as independent
93. Id. The termination of Umbehr's contract did not terminate his ability to do business with
the municipalities within the county. Id. He submitted bids to each of these municipalities and
eventually obtained contracts from five of the six cities with which he had been doing business
before his county contract was terminated, thus resulting in a loss of approximately 17 percent of
his annual revenues. Id.
94. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345-46. The Board defended its actions in part by claiming it had
non-speech grounds on which to terminate Umbehr's contract. Petitioner's Brief at 8-10,
Umbehr (No. 94-1654). Specifically, when Umbehr's criticism of the increased landfill rates did
not result in a reduction of those rates, he withheld payment of a substantial portion of the fees
that were owed to the County under the new fee schedule. Id. at 4-5. The Board sued in a
matter that eventually was decided by the Kansas Supreme Court. Id. at 5. Justice O'Connor
restricted her analysis in the instant case to the issue of Umbehr's ability to press his free speech
claim. Justice Scalia, in his joint dissent to the subject opinions, criticized the Court on this point.
95. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F. Supp. 837, 839 (D. Kan.
1993)).
96. Id. (summarizing the circuit court holding in Umbehr v. McClure, 44 F.3d 876 (10th Cir.
1995)).
97. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2646. According to the Court, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits were in
agreement with the Tenth Circuit's ruling in this case. Id. The Third and Seventh Circuits, how-
ever, had not extended government employee free speech protections to those classified as in-
dependent contractors. Id. In fact, the Court had earlier refused to grant certiorari in at least
one case where the Seventh Circuit had failed to extend such protections. See Downtown Auto
Parks., Inc. v. Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991). There
is an excellent discussion of the conflict among the circuits on the issue of independent contrac-
tor and PickeringlElrod rights. See Bradford S. Moyer, Note, The Future of Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois: A Proposal for Insulating Independent Contractors from Political Patronage, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 375 (1993).
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contractors. 98 The Board's primary argument was that the govern-
ment's diminished amount of control over independent contractors as
compared to the degree of control over its own employees "accentu-
ates the government's need to have the work done by someone it
trusts."99 The Board also argued that local governments would be ex-
posed to onerous burdens and cost of litigation should the court ex-
tend free speech protections to government contractors. 100
Umbehr argued, however, that the difference between government
employees and government contractors is notable because the govern-
ment has less concern over such issues as workplace harmony "where
the contractor [as here] does not work at the government's workplace
and does not interact daily with government officers and employ-
ees."'101 Umbehr also argued that the government need not fear, as it
would with its own employees, that a contractor's speech acts may be
perceived as representing the government it serves. 102
In response to these arguments, Justice O'Connor, writing for a
seven-justice majority, commented that "[tihe similarities between
government employees and government contractors with respect to
this issue are obvious."'1 03 In both cases the government not only has
an interest in controlling these individuals sufficiently to deliver effi-
cient, quality government services, but the government is also often
able to dismiss them for no reason at all.1 4 Furthermore, in both
cases as well, the government furnishes "a valuable financial benefit,
the threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill
speech on matters of public concern by those who, because of their
dealings with the government, 'are often in the best position to know
what ails the agencies for which they work.' ",105
98. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348.
99. Id. The Board argued that the relationship between employer and employee is substan-
tially different than between a principal and a contractor. Petitioner's Brief at 18, Umbehr (No.
94-1654). Whereas an employer can give direct orders to its employees, a principal can only
dictate results from a contractor. Id The Board argued that this impaired its ability to control
the performance of the contractor. Id. As a result, the Board stated, it needed greater latitude
to terminate contractors where harm was done to the relationship of trust between the parties.
Id. at 18-19.
100. Petitioner's Brief at 27-28, Umbehr (No. 94-1654).
101. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348. The language of Umbehr's argument has its roots in the
Pickering balancing test. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
102. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348.
103. Id at 2346-47. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Justice
Thomas. See infra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
104. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347.
105. Id (citing Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994)). This also echoes Justice
Marshall's opinion for the court in Pickering. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Justice O'Connor also was persuaded by Umbehr's argument that
there are important differences between government employees and
government contractors; specifically, that the government has an at-
tenuated interest with regard to government contractors on issues
such as harmonious work environments and the need to avoid any
apperances of independent contractors speaking on behalf of the gov-
ernment.'0 6 Importantly, Justice O'Connor rejected the notion that
the determination of constitutional protections should be based on
such distinctions as employee/independent contractor status, particu-
larly as such distinctions "can be manipulated largely at the will of the
government agencies concerned."'10 7
Justice O'Connor went on to reject the idea that offering free
speech protection for government contractors "represents an unwar-
ranted 'extension... of rights, particularly in the face of the Court's
many decisions to protect citizens from the loss of various government
benefits on the basis of arbitrary labels or in retaliation for verbal
acts.' 08 Finally, Justice O'Connor rejected the dissent's arguments
that the county's long-standing, "'open and unchallenged' tradition
of patronage in the context of government contractors barred the
Court from constitutionalizing this issue as a free speech matter. 0 9
As a result, the Court remanded the case for application of the
Pickering test to determine whether or not Umbehr's contract had
been impermissibly terminated in retaliation for his speech pertaining
to matters of public interest.1 0
106. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348. Justice O'Connor also concluded that both similarities and
differences between employee and independent contractor scenarios can be sufficiently managed
by using the Pickering balancing test to evaluate free speech infringements of government con-
tractors. Id. Justice O'Connor emphasized that this test, when properly applied, balances the
issues on a case-by-case basis, and offers deference to the government's interests regardless of
whether the matter involves an employee or an independent contractor. Id. at 2349. As a result,
concluded Justice O'Connor, imposing a brightline distinction between the two classes of indi-
viduals serves no constitutional purpose. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Justice O'Connor noted, "[N]o legally relevant distinction exists between employees
and contractors in terms either of the government's interest in using patronage or of the em-
ployee or contractor's interest in free speech." Id. (quoting Comment, Political Patronage In
Public Contracting, 51 U. Cn. L. REv. 518, 520 (1984)).
109. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2351. Justice O'Connor first rejected Justice Scalia's assertion that
fear of excessive litigation is an appropriate basis by which to deprive individuals of their consti-
tutional rights. Id. at 2350. She then cast aside Justice Scalia's notion that a historical pedigree
establishes patronage as permissible, especially in view of the country's long struggle to minimize
or eliminate such activity. Id at 2350-51. Justice Scalia's arguments are explored at greater
length in Section I-C.
110. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352. The courts below assumed that Umbehr's dismissal was the
result of his free speech, and therefore did not evaluate the issues in the context of the Pickering
test. Id. As a result, Justice O'Connor went on to articulate in detail the proper focus of the
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Justice Scalia issued a dissent to the Court's decision in Umbehr, but
as this dissent also addresses the Court's same-day decision in O'Hare
Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake ("O'Hare 11"), n ' that opinion
is examined at length in section II-C below.
B. Free Association: O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City
of Northlake n2
When the City of Northlake Police Department requires towing
services within the municipality, the department turns to a roster of
private towing companies maintained within its office. 113 When tow-
ing services are requested, the dispatcher calls the first company on
the roster and continues down the roster on each subsequent service
request so that towing assignments are evenly distributed to each tow-
ing service. 114 O'Hare Truck Service was initially placed on this ros-
ter in 1965 as the result of an agreement with the mayor that its place
on the roster would remain as long as it provided satisfactory towing
services." 5 In 1989, a similar agreement was reached between O'Hare
Truck Service and the new mayor." 6 When the mayor ran for reelec-
tion four years later, he asked O'Hare Truck Service's owner, John
Gratzianna, for a campaign coitribution. 17 When Gratzianna refused
and instead supported the opponent's campaign by displaying cam-
paign posters at the truck service's offices, O'Hare Truck Service was
removed from the police department roster.118 Gratzianna responded
by suing in federal district court, claiming the removal was in retalia-
tion for his political affiliation and, therefore, an impermissible in-
fringement of his First Amendment rights." 9
The district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected Gratzianna's arguments based on Seventh Circuit precedent in
LaFalce that denied the extension of Elrod/Branti protections to gov-
inquiry to be applied by the district court, including issues regarding burdens of proof and af-
firmative defenses available to the government as part of that test. Id. Justice O'Connor's ad-
monitions were in accord with the line of cases discussed throughout this Note.
111. O'Hare 11, 116 S. Ct., 2353, 2361 (1996).
112. Id. at 2353.
113. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 47 F.3d 883, 884 (7th Cir. 1995) [hereinaf-
ter O'Hare 1].
114. Id.




119. Id. The Court assumes arguendo that the dismissal was retaliatory in nature. Id.
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ernment contractors. 120 O'Hare II repeated LaFalce's, three points:
the court first found that, "compared to... governmental employees,
there was little chance that a contractor's freedom would be im-
pinged.' 121 Second, extending such protection would provide a basis
for virtually every rejected government bidder to file suit.' 22 Third,
this increased litigation burden on governments outweighed any free
speech rights unless the Supreme Court dictated otherwise. 23 Be-
cause the circuits were not in agreement on this issue, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 24
Justice Kennedy, again for a seven-justice majority, affirmed at the
outset that Elrod/Branti established that "patronage does not justify
the coercion of a person's political beliefs and associations."'1 25 He
rejected the city's assertion that "those outside the formal employ-
ment relationship are subject to... the direct and specific abridgment
of First Amendment rights.' 26 Justice Kennedy observed that if the
contribution had been solicited as an express quid pro quo for not
terminating the towing service arrangement, the mayor's action would
likely have violated criminal bribery statutes, and he saw no reason to
excuse the attempted coercion of political association simply because
it was executed in such a way as to avoid criminal liability. 127
As it did in Umbehr, the Court also rejected arguments that in-
dependent contractors are less financially dependent on government
income as compared to government employees, and therefore less in
need of First Amendment protections. 28 It noted that the city offered
no convincing data in support of its assertion and that the only avail-
able data suggested that independent contractors significantly depend
120. Id. The Seventh Circuit earlier ruled on this issue in Downtown Auto Parks, Inc. v.
Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to extend Rutan protections to independ-
ent contractors doing business with the government).
121. O'Hare 1, 47 F.3d at 885. Interestingly, the court did not provide any justification for its
conclusion here but simply rested on its earlier (and similarly unsupported) decision in LaFalce
v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984) (reasoning that em-
ployees are far more dependent on a single source of income than are independent contractors).
122. O'Hare I, 47 F.3d at 885.
123. Id.
124. O'Hare II, 116 S. Ct. at 2356.
125. Id. at 2357. For purposes of analyzing the lower court's decision, Justice Kennedy as-
sumed the circumstances involved an abridgment of the right of political association; however,
he also stated that this may have been too narrow a basis on which to decide the case. Id. See
infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
126. O'Hare II, 116 S. Ct. at 2358.
127. Id. at 2358-59.
128. Id. at 2359.
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on government income. 129 Although the Court conceded that some
contractors may be sufficiently independent that the threat of losing a
government contract may not have a coercive effect on them, the
Court countered that some government employees might be similarly
independent, thus disposing of this argument as a justification for dis-
tinguishing between government employees and government
contractors. 130
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that governments would be
burdened by excessive litigation in the wake of an extension of Elrod/
Branti protections to independent contractors.' 31 Justice Kennedy
pointed to evidence that there had been a minimum amount of litiga-
tion in the wake of Rutan, which at the time also faced opposition on
the basis of a predicted landslide of litigation. 132 Justice Kennedy
went on to point out that government agencies would still retain many
legitimate bases on which to terminate government contracts, as long
as they refrained from infringing First Amendment rights of speech
and association. 133
Ultimately, the Court rejected the employee/contractor distinction
as a basis for recognizing First Amendment rights of political affilia-
tion for some individuals but not for others.'3 It viewed the distinc-
tion as constitutionally irrelevant and feared that governments could
avoid constitutional liability simply by altering the labels attached to
particular jobs.135
129. Id. An Amicus Brief submitted by the Towing and Recovery Association of America
stated that more than 75% of all towing and recovery companies perform their services for state
and local government agencies, and that such towing generates between 30 and 60% of the
revenues of these towing companies. Amicus Brief of the Towing and Recovery Association of
America at 2-3, O'Hare Truck Service., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996) (No. 95-
191) (1996 WL 19040). The Association also indicated that many of its member towing service
agencies would be left without alternate sources of income in the wake of a dismissal by a local
government agency which were their primary source of income. Id. at 9-10.
130. O'Hare II, 116 S. Ct. at 2359-60. The Court also rejected arguments that, because some
contractors adeptly avoid such pressure by contributing to both political parties, government
misconduct is somehow excused. Id at 2360. "That some citizens find a way to mitigate govern-
mental overreaching, or refrain from complaining, does not excuse wrongs done to those who
exercise their rights." Id. The Court suggested that small contractors may be financially incapa-
ble of making such contributions, and might therefore be particularly susceptible to coercive
efforts by political entities. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Justice Kennedy's conclusion that Rutan had produced only a modest amount of
litigation was derived from the City's own brief, eventhough it was the City that was positing the
burdensome litigation argument. Id.
133. Id. at 2360-61.
134. Id. at 2359.
135. Id. Justice Kennedy identified the employee/contractor delineation merely as a "creature
of the common law of agency and tort law" and not, therefore, germane to the constitutional
question. Id.
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Although the Court held that government contractors are entitled
to the same First Amendment protections as are government employ-
ees, it saw this case as possessing elements of both political association
and of free speech.136 As a result, it remanded the case for a closer
examination by the lower courts to determine whether it was appro-
priate to apply the Elrod/Branti rule regarding political affiliation or
the Pickering balancing test regarding free speech.137
C. Justice Scalia's Joint Dissent to Umbehr and O'Hare
Truck Service
Justice Scalia issued a dissent to these two cases, in which he was
joined by Justice Thomas. 38 Justice Scalia systematically attacked not
only the decision to extend Pickering/Elrod39 protections to govern-
ment contractors, but also the legal and logical underpinnings of those
earlier decisions, thus generally following and expanding on his earlier
dissent in Rutan.'4° Justice Scalia also criticized the Court's approach
to the twin issues of affiliation and speech.' 41 Justice Scalia's argu-
ments were organized in the four broad categories outlined below.
1. Tradition Is Dispositive
"When a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of
Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread,
and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Repub-
lic, we have no proper basis for striking it down."' 42 Justice Scalia
136. Id. at 2361.
137. Id.
138. ld (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. PickeringlElrod refers to both the government employee free speech line of cases (Pick-
ering, Connick, and Perry) in which the Court applied a First Amendment balancing test, and to
the government employee right of political association cases (Elrod, Branti, Rutan) in which the
Court required a strict scrutiny examination.
140. O'Hare II, 116 S. Ct. at 2361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2369-73.
142. It at 2362 (quoting Justice Scalia's earlier dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S.
62, 95-96). Importantly, this reflects Justice Scalia's belief that the First Amendment "is replete
with constitutional ambiguities." Rutan, 497 U.S. at 102 (1990). If however, Justice Scalia deter-
mines that the language of the Constitution is clear, he believes that courts may not conduct any
balancing of interests against that clear language. Thus, Justice Scalia commented, "I have no
need to defend the value of confrontation, because the Court has no authority to question it ....
For good or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, and we are not at liberty to
ignore it ... [or] to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional guaran-
tees." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 869-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's
textualist views are not universally accepted even among so-called judicial conservatives. Thus
Judge Posner commented, "[t]o banish all discretion from the judicial process would indeed re-
duce the scope of constitutional rights." Richard J. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 24-25. Posner continued to state, "even the decision to read the
1997]
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thus asserted that traditions should serve as constitutional reference
points, particularly where, Justice Scalia claims, the language of the
First Amendment is amenable to more than one interpretation. 143 Be-
cause patronage practices have been "open, widespread, and unchal-
lenged" since the beginning of the Republic, Justice Scalia
characterized the Court's decision as social policy in the guise of con-
stitutional law and implored the Court to follow Justice Holmes' dic-
tum, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 144
2. The People Have Spoken
Justice Scalia declared that the people have spoken on the issue of
patronage practices and the Court should not meddle where state, fed-
eral, and local legislative bodies have actively and effectively regu-
lated patronage practices.' 45 He argued that the laws and regulations
controlling government contract practices "have brought to the field a
degree of discrimination, discernment, and predictability that cannot
be achieved by the blunt instrument of a constitutional prohibi-
tion." 46 Justice Scalia concluded that legislative decisions not to reg-
ulate reflect a determination that some degree of political favoritism is
constitution narrowly... is not a decision that can be read from the text. The Constitution does
not say, 'Read me broadly,' or 'Read me narrowly.' That decision must be made as a matter of
political theory." Id.
143. O'Hare II, 116 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia continued, "what
constitutes a 'law abridging the freedom of speech' is either a matter of history or else it is a
matter of opinion. Why else are not libel laws such an 'abridgment'? The only satisfactory
answer is that they never were." Id. at 2363.
144. Id. at 2364 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). Justice
Scalia said the American political process has always rested on the practice of rewarding political
allies and refusing to reward political opponents. Id. at 2362. He objected to Justice O'Connor's
lengthy list of patently illegal patronage practices as supporting the notion that the underlying
practice is unconstitutional, as Justice O'Connor's examples were illegal for non-constitutional
(statutory) reasons. Id. at 2363. With regard to the clear intent of the First Amendment, Justice
Scalia explained that the First Amendment protects against criminal sanctions (except for "tradi-
tion-based exceptions such as obscenity and 'fighting words"'), but beyond that, the intended
protection is far from clear. Id. at 2368.
145. Id. at 2364.
146. Id. at 2365. Justice Scalia also said that constitutionalizing this issue would diminish the
ability of a legislative body by robbing it of the ability to award contracts to the "lowest responsi-
ble bidder," as many statutes and regulations currently require. Id. at 2368-69 (emphasis added).
As an example, Justice Scalia cited a New Jersey Supreme Court case in which that court said
"[i]t is settled that the legislative mandate that a bidder be 'responsible' embraces moral integ-
rity just as surely as it embraces a capacity to supply labor and materials." Id. at 2369 (quoting
Trap Rock Ind., Inc. v. Kohl, 284 A.2d 161, 166 (N.J. 1971)). As a consequence of the Court's
decision, said Justice Scalia, this regulation will be permitted only if "disfavored moral views of
the bidder have never been verbalized, for otherwise the First Amendment will produce entitle-
ment to the contract, or at least guarantee a lawsuit." Id. at 2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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proper and that such assessments are rightfully made by legislatures,
not courts.147
3. This Decision is a Misguided Attempt to Level a Playing Field
That Cannot be Leveled
Justice Scalia next noted that it is impossible to create a democratic
system of government in which citizens are not, at times, intentionally
disadvantaged as a result of their political beliefs.148
Government favors those who agree with its political views, and dis-
favors those who disagree, every day-in where it builds its public
works, in the kinds of taxes it imposes and collects, in its regulatory
prescriptions, in the design of its grant and benefit programs-in a
million ways, including the letting of contracts for government
business.' 49
Scalia essentially said that the Court's effort to level the playing
field is foolish and misguided, placing it on a slippery slope that would
eventually cause the First Amendment to "require the City of Chicago
to have as few potholes in Republican wards (if any) as in Democratic
ones."150
Justice Scalia urged that the logical line of demarcation in avoiding
this slippery slope is to limit the grant of Pickering/Elrod rights to
government employees only.' 51 Although Justice Scalia rejected the
entire line of such cases as constitutionally suspect, he acknowledged
that government employees might be particularly susceptible to ef-
forts to curtail their rights of free speech and association because "the
loss of one's job is a powerful price to pay for one's politics."'1 52 A
government employee is always an individual person, and usually a
rather modestly paid one at that, whereas a government contractor is
often an entity, not a person.'5 3 According to Justice Scalia, while the
loss of a government job is the loss of a livelihood, the loss of a gov-
ernment contract rarely represents the loss of the entity's entire in-
come, or even an "indispensable" part of that income. 54
147. Id. at 2366. Implicit in Justice Scalia's argument is the notion that a legislative decision,
over time, not to address patronage practices, is a thoughtful and considered decision. In this
sense, Justice Scalia seems to suggest that legislative inaction in this case is a manifestation of the







154. Id. Justice Scalia relied in part on Judge Posner's analysis:
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One danger of attempting to level the playing field, according to
Justice Scalia, is that the extension of Pickering/Elrod protections to
government contractors would result in a volume of litigation that
could potentially cripple local governments. 155 As Justice Scalia con-
sidered the potential infringements of First Amendment rights in such
circumstances to be de minimis, he assessed the burden of this inevita-
ble increase in legislation as too great to justify the Court's decision. 5 6
Justice Scalia next rejected the Court's conclusion that a grant of
First Amendment rights should not turn on labels such as employee or
contractor that are amenable to manipulation by the government. 57
Justice Scalia focused his criticism here on Justice Kennedy's notion
that distinguishing constitutional rights on the basis of such labels is
improper because constitutional rights have "never depended on the
vagaries of state or federal law. '158 Instead, Justice Scalia observed,
litigation regarding deprivation of government benefits has often
turned on whether such takings constituted improper deprivations of
property without due process, a basis which is itself founded on state
law notions of property. 59
Justice Scalia illustrated his slippery slope concerns with a hypothet-
ical situation in which an openly racist and anti-Semitic organization
bids on a government contract to provide security services in public
housing facilities. 60 According to Justice Scalia, the Court's decision
to extend Pickering/Elrod protections means the government forfeits
"Although some business firms sell just to government, most government contractors
also have private customers. If the contractor does not get the particular government
contract on which he bids, because he is on the outs with the incumbent and the state
does not have laws requiring the award of the contract to the low bidder (or the laws
are not enforced), it is not the end of the world for him; there are other government
entities to bid to, and private ones as well. It is not like losing your job."
Id. at 2366-67 (quoting LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983)). Neither Judge
Posner nor Justice Scalia provided any empirical support for these assertions.
155. O'Hare 11, 116 S. Ct. at 2367 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. Justice Scalia specifically rejected Justice Kennedy's conclusion that there was no
substantial increase in litigation in the wake of the Court's decision in Rutan. Id. First, he con-
cluded that Justice Kennedy's tally was underinclusive. Id. Next, he said that, regardless of the
amount of employment-related litigation asserting Pickering/Elrod protections, extension of
such rights to independent contractors would cause a far greater volume of such litigation. Id. at
2367-68. He also noted that such litigation would be impermissibly difficult for governments to
defend on constitutional grounds as compared to the more explicit frameworks provided by
statutory laws and regulations, the implementation of which would require time-consuming and
expensive government contracting procedures. Id.
157. Id. at 2368.
158. Id. at 2368 (quoting Id. at 2350).
159. Id. In fact, Justice Scalia referred to cases on which the Court relied in making its deci-
sions in the instant cases, including Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
and Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
160. O'Hare I1, 116 S. Ct. at 2368 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the right to treat this bidder differently than others without such
views. 161 As a result, Justice Scalia suggested that the government
may be forced to hire a contractor whose propaganda puts that con-
tractor at odds with the government and the people it serves.162
4. The Dual Approach to Speech and Association is Faulty
Justice Scalia reserved his greatest vitriol for the Court's dual ap-
proach to free speech and association. 163 Justice Scalia amplified on
his previous dissent in Rutan with regard to the Court's application of
strict scrutiny to employment patronage cases. 164 He offered faint
praise for the Court's decision in Umbehr to apply the Pickering bal-
ancing test in that circumstance, but argued that the O'Hare Truck
Service decision to apply the strict scrutiny test of Elrod/Branti/Rutan
was inconsistent, illogical, and improper. 65 Perhaps Justice Scalia's
ultimate concern was that there is no logical basis to determine that
when a government employer infringes the right of free speech-a
right explicitly provided for in the First Amendment-such conduct
should be subject to a balancing test that is less strict than when the
same government employer infringes the right of political associa-
tion-a right which is not explicit in the amendment, but which has
been inferred by the Court.166
161. Id.
162. Id. Actually, Justice Scalia stopped short of specifically saying that the government will
be required to hire the organization, but the implications are clear.
163. Id at 2369.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2370-73. Justice Scalia also suggested that the dichotomy in the Court's approach
to free speech and affiliation was unprecedented: "When the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals wrote its opin-
ion the world had not yet learned that the Free Speech Clause is divided into two categories of
'right of free speech' and 'political affiliation."' Id. at 2372. This truly startling assertion is am-
ply refuted by the fact that, seven years earlier, two second-year law students were not only
aware of the distinction, but argued the pros and cons of the distinction in articles that were
published by the University of Chicago Law Review. See supra note 9. In addition to the four
categories addressed in the text of this Note, Justice Scalia made two additional points in his
dissent. First, he briefly suggested the Court mistakenly characterized government pressure to
refrain from certain public speech or political association as "coercion". O'Hare II, 116 S.Ct. at
2370 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Scalia quoted his own dissent in Rutan in
arguing that the label "coercion" is inappropriate to describe such pressures, because the word
implies compulsion to act in a certain way, rather than mere inducement, which, as Justice Scalia
sees it, is the only way to describe the circumstances in this case. ld. n.7 (quoting Rutan v.
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 109-10 (1990)). Finally, Justice Scalia argued that Gratzianna's
towing arrangement with the City of Northlake did not even rise to the level of a contract and
was thus not deserving of any protection at all, let alone constitutional protection under the First
Amendment. Id. at 2372-73. Thus, he concluded the Court should never have entertained this
case in the first place. Id at 2373. In fact, this was not really Justice Scalia's final argument, but
the remaining material was simply a biting attack and personal rehash of his earlier arguments in
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III. ANALYSIS
The core of the Court's decision in these cases is a sound one. Busi-
ness owners like Umbehr and Gratzianna are citizens first, and con-
tractors second. Their role as service providers to the government
grants the government the right to evaluate the quality and quantity of
their work in their capacity as contractors. This power, much like that
of an employer, is implicit in the contracting relationship. This role
does not, consistent with the Constitution, grant the government the
additional ability to abridge rights of expression or association that
are unrelated to the contracting relationship.
A. The Court's Decision to Extend Such Rights is a Small
and Logical Extension of The Court's First
Amendment Jurisprudence
With regard to constitutional rights, there is no logical distinction
between employee and contractor, nor has one been advanced. 167
Constitutional rights do not derive from the manner in which people
earn a living but from their status as citizens of the United States. In
fact, no argument founded on the First Amendment has been supplied
to distinguish between those who serve the government as independ-
ent contractors rather than as government employees. Instead, the
government and the dissent have offered social policy or so-called
practical reasons to continue patronage practices even as they protest
that the Court is making social policy in the guise of constitutional
law.168 In fact, criticism of the Court's decision rests largely on the
which he suggests that the Court is creating "a country [he does] not recognize" by its social
reengineering and unpredictable constitutional meddling. Id. at 2373-74. Those arguments need
not be expanded upon at length in this Note.
167. The only potentially relevant distinction between employee and independent contractor
which has been posited by the dissent is that of individual financial independence, and it was
presented without any empirical support. See supra notes 121, 154 and accompanying text. In
fact, the assertion was amply refuted by an Amicus Brief submitted on behalf of Umbehr. See
supra note 129.
168. Justice Scalia, and Justice Powell before him, criticized the Court for making social policy
instead of following the Constitution. See supra notes 62, 144-146 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, both justices devoted a considerable amount of their dissents to providing social
policy justifications for patronage. For instance, Justice Scalia suggested in his Rutan dissent that
the breakdown of patronage practices has eroded the effectiveness of government. Rutan, 497
U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J. dissenting). "It is self-evident that eliminating patronage will significantly
undermine party discipline; and that as discipline wanes, so will the strength of the two party
sytem." Id. at 106. "The stabilizing effects of such a [two party] system are obvious." Id. at 107.
"Increased reliance on money-intensive campaign techniques tends to entrench those in power
much more effectively than patronage-but without the attendant benefit of strengthening the
party system." Id. at 106. "The abolition of patronage ... prevents groups that have only re-
cently obtained political power, especially blacks, from following this path to economic and so-
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perceived benefits of patronage practices and is not specifically aimed
at the subject opinions, but at the cases that precede and are perceived
as enabling them.169
The Court is rightfully concerned that government can manipulate
the status of its workers in order to deny their constitutional rights.' 70
If free speech and association rights are limited to government em-
ployees, then governments, particularly local ones, would logically be
motivated to reduce payrolls and increase the number of independent
contractors in an effort to avoid the clear commands of Elrod and
Pickering. This would cause an increase in precisely the situation seen
here with small business owners like Umbehr and Gratzianno, who
were penalized for exercising rights completely unrelated to the quan-
tity or quality of work they produced in their capacities as government
contractors.'
71
Once the Court accepted the principle that government employees
are entitled to free speech and association protections, then the exten-
sion of such rights to government contractors was simply inevitable.' 72
Of course, this begs the argument that the entire line of cases should
be re-examined, but stare decisis weighs against such an argument not
only with regard to the Elrod/Pickering line of cases, but also with
regard to almost fifty years of Supreme Court decisions that have
barred the government from basing its decisions to dispense benefits
on free speech or association acts by citizen recipients of those
benefits.' 73
cial advancement." Id. at 108. Justice Powell commented in Elrod that patronage "contributed
significantly to the democratization of American politics." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 376
(1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). "Patronage practices broadened the base of political participation
by providing incentives to take part in the process, thereby increasing the volume of political
discourse in society." Id. at 379.
169. In fact, a continuous undercurrent in the briefs submitted in these cases on behalf of the
local government agencies was that the Court, which has changed in composition since the Pick-
eringlElrod employment cases, should reverse or limit the effect of those cases. See Petitioner's
Brief, Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996) (No. 94-1654) (1995 WL
477704); Amicus Brief of Illinois State Officials, O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake,
116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996) (No. 95-101) (1996 WL 75791).
170. See supra notes 107, 135 and accompanying text.
171. It is important to remember that plaintiffs, Umbehr and Gratzianna, have simply alleged
that such violations occurred, and the Supreme Court did not pass on the merits of these cases.
The Court's ruling is limited to the issue of whether government contractors have the right to
assert such claims. See supra notes 106, 115 and accompanying text.
172. Judge Posner suggested this inevitability over ten years ago: "Some day the Supreme
Court may extend the principle of its public-employee cases to contractors. But there are
enough differences . . . in the two classes of cases to persuade us not to attempt to do so."
LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1983).
173. See supra notes 33, 47, 54 and accompanying text; see also, TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12-26,
at 1015.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
B. This Modest Extension is Appropriate Because It is Directly
Linked to the Core First Amendment Interest of
Self-Governance
Although debate has often focused on whether the scope of the
First Amendment is so broad as to apply to subject matters ranging
from nude dancing to foul language, 74 it seems certain that the First
Amendment is particularly concerned with protecting those speech
acts that are necessary for self-governance. 175 As Laurence Tribe ob-
served, "[A]n abridgment of the [F]irst [A]mendment .. .could be
defined as insufficiently justified government rule, practice, or policy
that interferes with or discourages ... [the] pursuit of ends having
special first amendment significance-such as ... political change."'1 76
This particular concern with self-governance is a logical consequence
of the Constitution's significance as a "bulwark against tyranny.' 177
As a result, the decisions by the Court in the subject cases are particu-
larly important because they properly instruct federal, state and local
governments that they may not utilize the label "government contrac-
tor" as a pretext to justify retaliation against citizens who are acting as
citizens in matters relating to democratic self-governance. Further-
more, just as in the Pickering/Elrod government employment cases,
the Court has carefully crafted its decisions so as to limit the First
Amendment protection of government contractors only to those acts
which have special First Amendment significance. 78
C. Justice Scalia Is Wrong: Traditions, While A Proper Element Of
The Analysis, Are Not Dispositive
If tradition alone were dispositive in constitutional matters, the
United States would indeed be a very different place than the one we
174. See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12.
175. ANASTOPOLO, supra note 17. "The primary emphasis of the First Amendment ... is
upon free and open discussion of public affairs, as distinguished from what is now called freedom
of expression. Freedom of speech and the press, unlike the much broader freedom of expres-
sion, may be necessary for self-government. Id.
176. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12-26, at 1015.
177. Blasi, supra note 16.
178. The Court's special focus in the PickeringlElrod line and in the subject cases on self-
governance as a First Amendment priority is evidenced by comments throughout those opinions.
For example, see supra note 139 and accompanying text. Consider also that the Court does not
create a total bar on government action against employers or contractors who exercise free
speech or association rights. Instead, the Court simply demands that the government justify its
actions under the Pickering balancing test or under Elrod strict scrutiny.
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live in today.179 On this point, Justice Stewart said: "'If the age of a
pernicious practice were a sufficient reason for its continued accept-
ance, the constitutional attack on racial discrimination would, of
course, have been doomed to failure.'" ' 180 Justice Scalia answered that
tradition is dispositive only where such tradition does not conflict with
the text of the Constitution. 18' Of course, the very tradition cited by
Justice Stevens reveals a significant flaw in Justice Scalia's retort: a
variety of practices now viewed as offensive to the Constitution were
traditionally endorsed by the Supreme Court as constitutional; it is
only from our current perspective that these practices clearly conflict
with the text of the Constitution.'18 The fact that the tradition of seg-
regated public facilities was accepted as a constitutional one for so
long should urge us to look even more closely at the plain language of
the document itself. Such an examination reveals no language in the
First or Fourteenth Amendments to suggest that business owners must
submit to a reduction in their constitutional protections upon choosing
to do business with a branch of the federal, state, or local govern-
ment. 83 Such abridgments, regardless of their historical pedigree,
would appear to be as much at odds with the Constitution as was the
earlier tradition of segregated schools.' 84
179. "The Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by case, it is busy design-
ing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize." O'Hare If, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2373 (1996).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 82 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 81-82. Another such tradition, now long rejected, is the notion that the First
Amendment does not apply to state governments. See supra note 13. Our contemporary per-
spective has little difficulty with the concept that the Court's current position on the matter
comports with the language of the Constitution.
183. Some historical traditions, rooted in a time when government was a far less pervasive
factor in our daily lives, are perhaps no longer relevant. As Archibald Cox observed: "The very
intervention of government into more and more aspects of our daily lives makes us more con-
scious of the necessity of marking off a private spiritual area into which government should be
forbidden to enter." Cox, supra note 13, at 199. Indeed, as government payrolls increase and
government influence expands, it is appropriate for the Court to re-examine traditions that do
not seem to comport with the Constitution.
184. This is not to suggest that the two issues are equal in weight. Nonetheless, the compari-
son is an apt one in order to illustrate the flaws in Justice Scalia's reasoning. Closely intertwined
with the tradition argument is Justice Scalia's notion that the people have spoken. Board of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2364-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This argu-
ment need not be addressed substantially other than to note that contemporary commentators
probably said much the same thing to justify the now-unconstitutional practices just discussed.
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1. Justice Scalia's Tradition Argument Rests on Circular Reasoning
Which is Logically Unsound and Constitutionally
Dangerous
Justice Scalia stated that traditions are dispositive when the lan-
guage of the Constitution is unclear.185 This begs the question: Is the
language of the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech"'186) so manifestly ambiguous so as to
justify reliance on tradition as a mechanism of constitutional interpre-
tation? Justice Scalia answers the question unequivocally: Yes! 187
Yet he does so without any critical analysis. Consider that Justice
Black, one of this century's great Supreme Court justices, concluded
just as unequivocally that the language of the amendment is crystal
clear. 188 But a more interesting perspective of Justice Scalia's reason-
ing may be had by examining his own, earlier analysis of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause. 189
The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall ... be confronted with the witnesses against him."'190 Jus-
tice Scalia concluded this language clearly commands that a criminally
accused person has the right to a trial that includes the presence of
witnesses who have accused him, and to cross-examine those wit-
nesses in open court regardless of any other public policy considera-
tions that might weigh against the cross-examination of such
witnesses. 191 He indicated that the Court has no authority to question
this command, because the language of the Sixth Amendment is
clear.192 And yet the language of the Sixth Amendment does not use
the word cross-examination. Nor does it specifically prohibit consider-
ation of public policy issues regarding the presence of witnesses. In
actuality, the so-called clarity of this language derives from two things:
first, it derives from the absence of any language which balances the
right against social policy considerations; and second, it derives from
the fact that the tradition of cross-examination provides the word con-
frontation with clarity.
Thus the clarity of the constitutional language is derived partly from
the tradition that gives the language meaning. Contrast this with the
185. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
186. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
187. O'Hare II, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2363 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
189. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 869-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
191. Craig, 497 U.S. at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
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language of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the right of free speech."'1 93 Just as with the Sixth Amend-
ment, there is an absence of language which balances this right against
other policy considerations. Yet Justice Scalia has no difficulty in
describing this language as "assuredly as susceptible of one meaning
as of the other."' 194 The difference, of course, is that with the Sixth
Amendment, our historical traditions leave no doubt as to the specific
command of the amendment. However with regard to the First
Amendment, our traditions provide no such clarity. As a result, Jus-
tice Scalia's argument is really a circular one which is unsupported by
logic: defer to the language when it is clear, use traditions when the
language is unclear, yet rely on traditions to determine whether, in
fact, the language is actually clear.
More dangerous than circularity of logic however, is the result of
such reasoning. If the government can successfully evade the clear
command of constitutional language for a sufficient period of time,
then this evasion will become a tradition which will undermine and
substitute for the otherwise clear language of the document. The dan-
ger of tyrannical government action is manifest in such a system of
constitutional analysis, and evidenced, for example, by the racial injus-
tices referred to by Justice Stevens.195
2. The Danger of Relying on Tradition as a Constitutional
Guidepost is Illustrated by a Particularly Ominous and
Ever-present Government Tradition
Consider that one of this country's great traditions may very well be
the fact that its various governments have always resisted limitations
on their power and autonomy and courts have always acted (and are
necessary) to reign in such excesses. 196 Indeed, this fact is one of the
central purposes of the very existence of the Constitution, of the Bill
of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular. 197 Perhaps for
193. U.S. CONST. amend I.
194. O'Hare II, 116 S.Ct. at 2363. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
196. "[It suffices to observe that ... the continuing perception of many Americans over two
centuries has been unshaken: whatever the model, government cannot be relied upon to behave
voluntarily as the Constitution demands.... without some form of intervention from a point at
least partially outside of ordinary majoritarian politics." TRIBE, supra note 14, §1-6, at 9.
197. "[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature... in order to keep the latter within limits assigned to their authority." THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 492 (quoted in MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D.
RowE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECrVEs 4 (1993)); see also West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (arguing that "[t]he very purpose of a
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of public controversy. ...
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these reasons, the Court has progressively moved towards a broader,
more literal application of the First Amendment. 198 With fear of tyr-
anny as a guidepost, the Court has properly rejected Justice Scalia's
assertions and acted to protect government contractors from unwar-
ranted and unconstitutional interference with their right to exercise
their most fundamental rights as citizens.
D. This is Not About Leveling a Playing Field, It is About
Distinguishing Between The Government's Role as
Government and Its Role as Employer
or Contractor.
Justice Scalia suggested that the Court, by preventing a government
employer from taking a direct retaliatory action against a contractor
who engages in expression or association in matters of public interest,
is somehow leading the country down the path to a world in which
allocation of scarce government resources must be perfectly distrib-
uted in order to avoid violating the First Amendment.199 More pre-
cisely, Justice Scalia suggested in his Rutan dissent that since a police
department has the right to regulate the hair length of its police of-
ficers, it similarly has the authority to regulate off-the-job political ex-
pression.200 He likewise suggested by way of a hypothetical scenario
that the government will soon be required to hire the low bidder for a
public housing security contract even if the bidder has publicly advo-
cated racism and racist policies.201 Both assertions illustrate Justice
Scalia's failure to distinguish between the government's role as gov-
ernment and its role as an employer. 202
The government has the ability to regulate the length of a police
officer's hair precisely because it relates to on-the-job appearance and
One's right to life, liberty and property, to free speech ... and other fundamental rights may not
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."); Blasi, supra note 16, at 449-
50 (arguing that constitutional provisions should be interpreted to protect against the worst po-
tential government abuse possible, and that the First Amendment should be interpreted so as to
protect against a future which might produce a narrow and intolerant majority).
198. See supra notes 13, 21-27 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 148-156 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
201. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, at 94 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976)).
202. Justice Scalia also appears not to distinguish here between legitimate public interests
such as the right of free speech without fear of losing a job or a contract, and the illegitimate
interests of those in government who wish only to remain in government. See GOlrtLEB, supra
note 66. "The term compelling government interests is a misnomer. The interests themselves
can hardly be governmental; they must be public." Id., at 7.
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effectiveness. 203 This is not regulation of off-the-job behavior; off-the-
job appearance is inescapably affected by the regulation of an on-the-
job issue. Just as a private employer would be able to regulate the
hair length of its employees, so can the government when it is acting
in its capacity as an employer. In fact, one might speculate that the
Court would not have permitted the government to regulate off-the-
job hair length if the policeman could miraculously arrive at work
each day with the correct hair length and appearance.
Likewise, a private employer should theoretically be able to turn
away a contract bidder by demonstrating that one who openly advo-
cates racial hostility is not qualified to patrol a housing project that is
substantially populated by racial minorities. That bidder might be dis-
qualified either because one can rationally predict inappropriate con-
duct by the bidder, or because the residents would reasonably lack
confidence in the ability or intent of the bidder to protect their inter-
ests. These are both on-the-job issues, and to the extent a private em-
ployer could reasonably demonstrate that such a bidder was
unqualified, the government under Umbehr and O'Hare II could draw
the same conclusion in its capacity as an employer and contractor.
Distinguish these examples from instances in which the government
acts as government to deny or terminate a contract with an independ-
ent contractor. For instance, if a tow truck operator supports the
political candidate of his choice, this is not in any way related to his
ability or intent to render services under the contract. Depriving the
tow-truck operator of this right is not regulation of on-the-job or job-
related conduct or expression. This is simply an intrusion into the ex-
ercise of rights as a private citizen. To allow the government to regu-
late such off-the-job conduct would not be supporting its role as an
employer, but would simply enhance its power in its role as govern-
ment. There is no First Amendment basis to allow such an increased
grant of power.2° 4
203. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247. And note that the Court's decision in the subject cases does not
expand the scope of citizen protections here. It simply recognizes that citizens do not forfeit
such rights upon securing a government contract unless certain circumstances are present.
204. See id. in which Justice Scalia cites a series of cases to support his argument that govern-
ment is permitted to regulate the private conduct of its employees: O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). In each of
these cases except Letter Carriers, the Court's approval was limited to government regulation-
in its role as an employer-of conduct or expression that was directly related to on-the-job is-
sues. In Letter Carriers, the government was permitted to bar political campaigning and fun-
draising by its employees. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556. Importantly, the regulation at issue in
Letter Carriers case was non-partisan and content-neutral, unlike the government actions in the
subject opinions which punished expression or association because of its content. As well, Jus-
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IV. IMPACT
A reading of Justice Scalia's dissent suggests that a litigation dooms-
day is about to overwhelm and bankrupt municipal governments
throughout the country as hordes of opportunistic contractors storm
the judicial gates for money or revenge in the wake of lost contract
bids.205 Apparently, this litigation doomsday will be complemented
by a logarithmic increase in the already incomprehensible amount of
government procurement procedures as governments large and small
scramble to save themselves by erecting barriers to the litigation on-
slaught.206 But Justice Scalia's nightmare scenario seems unlikely.
His description of the contracting process as a choice between the ex-
tremes of carefree decision-making on the one hand and Byzantine
procurement statutes on the other ignores the realities of the market-
place. Any private parties currently involved in contract bidding
processes must be prepared to defend their selection decisions. They
do so without the aid of expensive, multi-layered procurement proce-
dures. The smaller the business, the less sophisticated the arrange-
ment. This suggests that where small local governments contract with
small businesses, simple merit-based selection systems will sufficiently
protect the government from accusations of pretextual dismissal. In
fact, such mechanisms should already be in place to protect govern-
ments from accusations of race-based or other illegal hiring and con-
tracting practices. All of this suggests, despite the fact that ambitious
attorneys or plaintiffs will no doubt test the mettle of local govern-
ments, such obstructions will fade as soon as governments prove they
have mastered basic business competencies possessed by thousands of
common business entities.
In fact, the inference that there will be relatively little real world
impact from these decisions can be drawn directly from Justice
Scalia's own argument that most government contractors are huge
corporate conglomerates bidding on mega-contracts via the many pro-
curement processes that are already in place. 207 Such corporations are
not likely to be impacted by the Court's decisions in Umbehr and
O'Hare Truck Service.
More likely, it is small business owners who will see the impact and
enjoy the benefits of the Court's modest extension of free speech and
tice O'Connor provided sound reasoning to distinguish between government employees and
contractors and to further insulate independent contractors from such control by the govern-
ment. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
205. O'Hare 11, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 2367 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2364-66.
207. Id.
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association protections. Where small business operators/government
contractors, acting in their capacity as citizens, wish to publicly criti-
cize the governments they serve, they will be able to do so with more
confidence that their income depends more upon the quality of the
services they provide than upon the exercise of their constitutional
rights. As a result, governments, particularly local governments, will
have to tolerate more public criticism and will have to be more cau-
tious about their decisions to terminate or to fail to renew contracts.
Such actions will have to be defensible on an objective basis.208 This is
no different than most contractors/employers who are generally bur-
dened with the responsibility to act in good faith and in accordance
with the terms of the contracts they enter. Businesses and employers
generally have not been bankrupted by such burdens, nor have they
proved unable to manage the quality of services they receive from
suppliers and service providers. There is little reason to suggest that
governments are any different.
V. CONCLUSION
By extending Elrod/Pickering protections to independent contrac-
tors, the Court has simply made a logical extension of First Amend-
ment doctrine so that citizens can enjoy speech and association
unencumbered by meaningless labels. This extension is consistent not
only with the last thirty years of employment cases, but comports with
the Court's long-standing move towards a broader, more literal inter-
pretation of the First Amendment. This trend is not only consistent, it
is wise. The Court is properly displaying a concern in these and other
First Amendment cases that the right to participate in democratic
processes has the highest priority, and that such a right should not,
and cannot, absent special circumstances, be abridged simply because
of the manner in which a person earns a living.
208. The notion that government must defend against charges that it has acted on pretext or
improper motivation is hardly a new one. "The Supreme Court and lower courts have routinely
inquired into the motivation underlying executive or administrative decisions in a variety of
contexts." TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12-5, at 814-15. This practice dates back as far as 1886. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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